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ARTICLES
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This article will examine the United Nations Security Council's efforts to
implement, preserve, and universalize the obligations of the 1968 Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. This discussion will lead to questions regarding the
Security Council's role and authority in the international legal system, and
ultimately to a consideration of how the international legal system can better
guarantee that the Security Council does not exercise an unwarranted degree of
legal power at the expense of the member states of the United Nations.
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INTRODUCTION
In this Article I will discuss the United Nations Security Council's
efforts to implement, preserve, and universalize the obligations of the
1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). This discussion will lead
to questions regarding the Security Council's role and authority in the
international legal system, and ultimately to a consideration of how the
international legal system can better guarantee that the Security Coun-
cil does not exercise an unwarranted degree of legal power at the
expense of the member states of the United Nations.
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. © 2012, Daniel H.Joyner.
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The Security Council currently sees itself at the apex of authority in
international security law, with essentially unlimited power to address
situations that its controlling permanent members determine to be a
threat to international peace and security, and to fashion whatever
compulsory remedy it deems appropriate to this end. This is in fact a
fairly recent development. For the first fifty-six years of its existence, the
Security Council's own understanding of its role and authority under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter was much more modest;
analogous to that of an executive body, entrusted by all UN members
with the responsibility and authority to maintain and restore interna-
tional peace and security, primarily in cases where the generalized
obligations of the UN Charter or other rules of international law had
been breached. It understood that it was to use its powers under
Chapter VII to authorize effective collective measures on a case by case
basis, responding to the dynamics of international relations as they
occurred, and through the passage of resolutions which authorized
forceful or non-forceful measures, to be applied for a temporary
duration as against the specific authors of threats to international
peace.1
This more recent understanding by the Security Council of the scope
of its authority is that the Council is empowered not only to act as an
executive body, but rather also to act as a legislative body crafting proactive
and permanent legal edicts covering important areas of international
relations including terrorism (UNSC Resolution 13732) and weapons
of mass destruction proliferation (UNSC Resolution 15403), and even
further to act as a judicial body determining the legal rights and
obligations of UN members (UNSC Resolutions 18744 and 19295). This
more recent understanding can be seen in embryonic form in the
activity of the Security Council through the 1990s, for example in the
creation of two ad hoc international criminal tribunals.6 However, it
began to be most obviously demonstrated after the attacks on Septem-
ber 11, 2001, with the passage of Security Council Resolution 1373.7
1. DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROLIFERAT1ON OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION 176-81 (2009).
2. SeeS.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
3. SeeS.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
4. SeeS.C. Res. 1874, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1874 (June 12, 2009).
5. SeeS.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9,2010).
6. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
7. See Matthew Happold, Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United
Nations, 16 LEIDENJ. INT'L L. 593 (2003).
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Indeed, as we will see in the case studies below in the issue area of
nuclear nonproliferation and the NPT, the Security Council appears
now to consider itself to possess ultimate and essentially unlimited legal
authority-i.e. to represent something of a legal hegemon-by virtue
of its UN Charter mandate to maintain and restore international peace
and security. Authority, for example, to command a state to re-accede
to a treaty from which that state has duly withdrawn, according to the
treaty's terms. Authority to command a state not to take action that is
recognized by a broadly subscribed treaty to be that state's "inalienable
right." Indeed, the Security Council has for the past few years been so
bullish in its attitude toward its own authority, and has ostensibly used
that authority to trample on so many of the most important underlying
principles of the international legal system, that we may need to begin
seriously considering how the international legal system can protect
states from the authoritarian Security Council, which the end of the
Cold War, and the beginning of the War on Terror, have unleashed.
This paper will proceed with three case studies of Security Council
activity in the nuclear weapons proliferation issue area, in which the
Security Council will be argued to have demonstrated an understand-
ing of its own unlimited legal authority, by acting in disharmony with
fundamental principles of the international legal system. These case
studies will include the passage of Security Council Resolution 1540 in
2004, as well as the respective state-specific cases of the nuclear pro-
grams of Iran and North Korea. The paper will then conclude with a
consideration of how international law should respond to the Security
Council's demonstrated claim to being essentially legibus solutus (un-
bound by law) in its exercise of its Chapter VII authority to maintain
and restore international peace and security.
I. RESOLUTION 1540
The first case study to be considered is that of the passage of UN
Security Council Resolution 1540, which was adopted by the Security
Council on April 28, 2004. This resolution was passed, not coinciden-
tally, shortly after the revelation in February 2004 of the existence of a
long-standing clandestine nuclear materials smuggling ring headed by
the father of Pakistan's gas centrifuge program, Dr. Abdul Qadeer
Khan.8 In Resolution 1540, the Security Council undertook to address
a number of fundamental limitations of the existing weapons of mass
8. See Daniel Joyner, International Legal Responses to WMD Proliferation, in The GLOBALIZATION
OF POLMCAL VIOLENCE 86, 96-97 (Christopher Hughes & Richard Devetak eds., 2007).
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destruction (WMD) nonproliferation treaties and regimes system.9
In the Security Council meetings leading up to the passage of
Resolution 1540, some of which were opened to comment from
non-Council members, many states noted the need for such a resolu-
tion to close "gaps" in the coverage of existing nonproliferation treaty
instruments.' ° One such gap identified by states during these meetings
was the problem of the non-universality of the system, a result of the
fact that nonproliferation treaties, as all treaties, are adopted only
voluntarily by states, and that for a variety of reasons many states,
including some of significant proliferation concern, have remained
outside the nonproliferation legal and organizational system. 1'
A second major challenge to the nonproliferation treaties and
regimes system is the fact that all existing restrictions within the
regimes upon manufacture, possession, and trafficking in weapons-
related technologies are addressed to states themselves.12 Thus, at the
international level there is no substantive restriction on private parties,
including business entities as well as other non-state actors, engaging in
any of these activities. The utility of Resolution 1540 in addressing this
non-state actor gap in the nonproliferation treaties and regimes system
was noted by numerous states, particularly in the context of interna-
tional efforts to combat the phenomenon of terrorism.
13
9. See Masahiko Asada, Security Council Resolution 1540 to Combat WMD Terrorism: Effectiveness
and Legitimacy in International Legislation, 13J. CoNrLicr & SECURITY L. 303, 313 (2009).
10. As a representative of New Zealand noted:
[W]e place importance on the fact that the draft resolution would also impose restraints
on those States that have deliberately chosen to stand outside the major disarmament
and non-proliferation treaties to which most States, including my own, have committed
themselves. This is a major gap that the draft resolution can begin to fill.
U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950 mtg. at 21, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (Apr. 22, 2004) [hereinafter 4950th
Meeting].
11. See Seema Gahlaut & Victor Zaborsky, Do Export Control Regimes Have Member They Really
Need?, 23 CoMP. STRATEGY 73 (2004); Barry Kellman, Criminalization and Control of WMD Prolifera-
tion: The Security Council Acts, NONPROiFERATON REv., Summer 2004, at 143, 159; Jean du Preez,
The 2005 NPT Review Conference: Can It Meet the Nuclear Challenge, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, April
2005, at 6; Daniel H. Joyner, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation,
and International Law, 30 YALEJ. INT'L L. 507, 518 (2005) [hereinafterJoyner Initiative]; cf Asada,
supra note 9.
12. SeeJoyner Initiative, supra note 11, at 519.
13. As a representative of Benin stated:
I would like to thank the States that have requested the holding of this open meeting,
which makes it possible for us to open to all Member States the debate on the danger of
the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by non-State actors. This
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The resolution addresses the non-state actor problem described
above in operative paragraph 1, in which it provides that "all States shall
refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors that
attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer
or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of
delivery.' 14 Furthermore, operative paragraph 2 provides that "all
States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and
enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor
to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in
particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of
the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or
finance them. 15
It then addresses in operative paragraph 3 the problem of non-
universality of nonproliferation law by directly imposing an obligation
upon states to establish and maintain effective export control laws and
regulations at the national level, "including appropriate laws and
regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and
controls on providing funds and services related to such export and
trans-shipment such as financing ... as well as establishing end-user
controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil
penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations."
1 6
As in Resolution 1373 on international terrorism, passed in 2002,
Resolution 1540 in operative paragraph 4 establishes a Committee of
the Security Council to monitor the implementation by states of the
obligations imposed by the resolution.1 7 Although Resolution 1373 and
Resolution 1540 were adopted in very different contexts and are meant
to cover quite different, although of course related, areas of law, they
share important similarities in structure as well as in legal import.
These two resolutions have been claimed by some commentators to
have ushered in a new age of Security Council jurisprudence and to
danger relates above all to the emergence of non-State actors that vie with States for
dominance in the area of violent force, a new phenomenon, a phenomenon that also
highlights the existence of a legal void in the arsenal of contemporary international law
and that calls for the community of nations to cooperate without delay to provide the
means to prevent the danger.
4950th Meeting, supra note 10, at 12.
14. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 3,1 1.
15. Id. 2.
16. Id. 3(d).
17. SeeHappold, supra note 7, at 594; Asada, supra note 9, at 314.
2012]
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have signaled an intent by the Council to act as a legislative body, in
supplementation of its executive functions.
1 8
There had before the passage of Resolution 1373 been other contro-
versial acts of the Security Council which had caused debate on the
topic of the proper role and powers of the Council. 19 Notable in this
regard were the. actions before the International Court of Justice
stemming from the explosion of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland in 1988. However, although in the Lockerbie cases there was an
allegation that the Council had overstepped its prerogatives under the
Charter, there was no hint of legislative aspirations in the Council's
actions.20 The resolutions involved were clearly targeted against the
acts and omissions of one state, Libya, and they set clear demands
which, if met, would bring about the end of the mandate for exercise of
Council authority. Thus, they were in keeping with the Council's
understood role, if perhaps excessively bold in construction.
Because of the predominantly non-legislative characteristics of this
and virtually all other Security Council decisions, it can be concluded
that at the end of the decade of the 1990s, the Security Council had not
yet passed a true piece of international legislation.21 However, in the
swelling of outrage and concern following the attacks of September 11,
2001, and, as has been alleged, with little foresight of the legal import
of what they were doing, the Council passed Resolution 1373.22 The
Council passed this resolution not to respond specifically to the Septem-
ber 11 acts of terror themselves, nor to mete out any measure of
punishment upon its perpetrators, nor to specifically target them or
those states that aided and abetted them. The Council rather used the
attacks as a backdrop and a catalyst for the establishment of a much
broader and temporally indefinite normative regime addressing the
subject of international terrorism.
The context of the passage of Resolution 1540 offers even less
evidence of a specific situation of threat to international peace and
18. SeeHappold, supra note 7, at 595; Paul Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96AM.J.
INT'L L. 901,901-02 (2002).
19. See e.g., Marii Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple: Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical View,
6 EuR. J. IMT'L L. 325 (1995); Keith Harper, Does the United Nations Security Council Have the Competence to
Act as a Court and Legislature?, 27 N.Y.U.J. INr'L L. & POL. 103 (1994); Bernd Martenczuk, The Security
Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockertie?, 10 EuR. J. INT'L L. 517
(1999) (discussing the validity of Chapter VII resolution in the Lockerbiecases).
20. See Martenczuk, supra note 19, at 525.
21. See Szasz, supra note 18, at 901-02; Happold, supra note 7, at 596; Martti Koskenniemi,
International Legislation Today: Limits and Possibilities, 23 Wisc. INT'L L.J. 61, 74 (2005).
22. See Happold, supra note 7, at 595.
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security against which it is to be understood that the resolution
operates, and to which it is to be understood to respond. Again, the
revelation of the Khan network provided a circumstantial pretext
which seemed to explain the prioritization of the subject of WMD
proliferation and its address by the Council in Resolution 1540, but the
resolution itself went far beyond simply responding to the existence of
this network. It newly imposed a broad set of obligations upon all UN
member states, which were purposed in changing permanently the
structure and content of national legal systems.
These resolutions, simply put, cannot be described as ad hoc re-
sponses to events urgently arising in international politics. They are
rather calculated, proactive, forward-looking normative creations. In
both cases the Security Council simply determined that an entire class
of actions, which have been and which may be in the future committed
potentially by any state, constitute a threat to international peace and
security. The Council then decided in each case that all UN member
states shall take extensive measures, broadly prescribed in the resolu-
tions, including changes to their national legal systems, in order to
combat these ill-defined present and future threats. The obligations
imposed under both Resolutions 1373 and 1540 are not temporally
limited, either explicitly or implicitly. Their duration is clearly meant to
be indefinite. Moreover, there are no specifically targeted states. The
obligations imposed in the resolutions are stated in an abstract man-
ner, so as to make their application clearly universal.
A. The UN Charter and WMD Nonproliferation Law
The United Nations Charter makes no mention of the term "prolif-
eration" and makes no distinction in the language of its provisions as
between conventional and non-conventional (i.e. nuclear, chemical,
and biological) weapons. The Charter rather uses the terms "disarma-
ment" and the "regulation of armaments" in three of its articles; Article
11 (1), Article 26, and Article 47.23 These provisions address the subject
of the regulation of military armaments generally through interna-
tional law, as such technologies existed and were maintained in na-
tional arsenals at the time of the drafting of the Charter. 4 The UN
Charter system that these provisions comprise was constructed to
address issues of international arms control and to facilitate the genera-
tion of international law to regulate this issue-area.
2012]
23. U.N. Charter arts. 11, 26, 47.
24. SeeDaniel Cheever, The U.N. and Disarmament, 19 INT'L ORG. 463 (1965).
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Article 11(1) is a further specification of the general powers of
consideration and recommendation granted to the General Assembly
in Article 10.25 The General Assembly under Article 11 (1) is to con-
sider "general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security," a power that should be read to include
consideration of abstract, general ideas about how member states
should work together, and fundamental principles that should under-
pin the legal relationships that bind states in this area.26 This power is
apposite the General Assembly due to its character as the essential
deliberative organ of the UN, and the only UN body comprised of all
members of the organization, thus allowing the broadest possible
spectrum of interests and perspectives to have input into the formula-
tion of these basic principles governing state cooperation in interna-
tional arms control efforts.27
The role of the Security Council in this system is specified in Article
26, which provides:
In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of
international peace and security with the least diversion for
armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the
Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the
assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article
47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations
for the establishment of a system for the regulation of arma-
ments.
2 8
A number of points regarding the Security Council's role under
Article 26 bear mention. First is to observe that Article 26, in addition to
conferring powers and function upon the Security Council, also estab-
lishes responsibilities for the Council in carrying out its complementary
role with the General Assembly in the exercise of its Article 11(1)
powers.2 9 The Council is given responsibility, on the basis of the
recommendations of "general principles of cooperation" it receives
from the General Assembly, and with the assistance of the Military Staff
25. SeeTHE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 277-78 (Bruno Simma et al. eds.,
2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter U.N. COMMENTARY].
26. See id. at 277-80.
27. See generally Louis B. Sohn, Enhancing the Role of the General Assembly of the United Nations in
Crystallizing International Law, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST
CENTURY 549, 557-58 (Jerzy Makararczyk ed., 1975).
28. U.N. Charter art. 26.
29. Id.
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Committee, to formulate concrete plans in order to implement the
general principles recommended by the Assembly.30 These plans are to
compose a coherent "system" for the regulation of armaments, which
would imply that the plans to be authored by the Council using this
power are not to be situation-specific, as in the case of an ad hoc
response to a discrete event in international affairs. Rather, these plans
are to form the basis for a universally applicable, enduring system of
"practical and effective" international arms control.3 '
It should be emphasized that the Security Council under Article 26
only has the power to formulate plans. It must then submit those plans
to the member states of the United Nations for their approval and for
establishment through multilateral treaty as actual legal principles
governing their relationships with each other.32 The Security Council's
plans in and of themselves have no binding force upon members and
are merely hortatory offerings, although endowed with the gravitas of
having been generated through the Charter system for creation of arms
control law.33 Members may however choose either to accept or reject
these plans, in analogous fashion to the ratification of UN-approved
treaties by member states. As Hans Kelsen has observed:
[W]ith respect to Article 26 of the Charter ... the "plans"
formulated by the Security Council "for the establishment of a
system for the regulation of armaments" may provide for reduc-
tion of armaments; they must be "submitted to the members of
the United nations." That means that they are binding upon
the members only if accepted by them. The obligation is
established by a treaty concluded by the members with the
organization. Unlike Article 8, paragraph 4 of the [League of
Nations] Covenant, Article 26 does not provide expressly for
the "adoption" of the plan by the members, but if the plan of
the Security Council is to be submitted to the members, it can
be only for the purpose of being adopted by them. 4
Thus under the Charter system, member states retain their full
sovereignty over decisions to enter into legal relationships in the area
30. Id.
31. See BERNH Da G. BECHHOEFER, POSTwAR NEGOTIATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL (1961); 0. V.
Bogdanov, Outlawry of War, and Disarmament, 133.2 REcUEIL DES COURS 15 (1971); U.N. COMMEN-
TARY, supra note 25, at 466-68.
32. U.N. Charter art. 26.
33. See U.N. COMMENTARY, supra note 25, at 466-68.
34. HANS KELSEN, CoLLEcrrvE SECURITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 214 (2001 ed. 1957).
2012]
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of international arms control. This right is not presumptively subsumed
under the Council's binding decision-making powers under Article 25,
nor under its broad powers to maintain international peace and
security under the articles of Chapter VII.
3 5
B. The Limits of Chapter VII
The UN Charter in Article 24 confers upon the Security Council
"primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security."3 6 In the same paragraph the members of the United Nations
"agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility, the
Security Council acts on their behalf. '3 7 This statement is the closest
the Charter comes to attempting to remedy the non-democratic reality,
made requisite by geo-political circumstances in 1945, that the most
powerful organ of the UN and the only organ capable of issuing
decisions binding upon all UN members, is composed of only fifteen of
those members (who now total 191), five of whom are given permanent
status and have an effective veto power over every decision of the
Council.
In this language seeming to imply a representative relationship
between the Council and the rest of the UN membership, the Charter
attempts to legitimize the declaration in Article 25 by the membership,
that all UN members "agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."38 Thus,
Article 25 establishes the binding character of Security Council deci-
sions upon the entirety of the UN membership.39
Although the specific powers granted to the Security Council under
the Charter, and particularly in the articles of Chapter VII, are both
broadly and vaguely worded, the Charter does provide limits upon the
discretion of the Council in its exercise of these powers. As the Council
derives its powers from the Charter's terms, it is by the same process
bound by the constraints and limitations of those terms. As the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia has observed:
35. Hans Kelson, No. 11, THE LAW OF THE UNITFD NATIONS: A CRmCAL ANALYSIS OF ITS
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 293-95 (George W. Keeton & Georg Schwarzenberger eds., 2d ed. 1951).
36. U.N. Charter art. 24.
37. Id.
38. U.N. Charter art. 25.
39. See the discussion of Article 24 as an independent source of authority for binding
decisions of the Security Council in Happold, supra note 7, at 604.
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The Security Council is an organ of an international organiza-
tion, established by a treaty which serves as a constitutional
framework for that organization. The Security Council is thus
subjected to certain constitutional limitations, however broad
its powers under the constitution may be. Those powers cannot,
in any case, go beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of the
organization at large, not to mention other specific limitations
or those which may derive from the internal division of power
within the organization. In any case, neither the text nor the
spirit of the Charter conceives of the Security Council as legibus
solutus (unbound by law).o
One such limiting provision upon the Council's power is Article
24(2), which provides that "[in discharging these duties the Security
Council shall act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the
United Nations., 41 The purposes and principles of the United Nations
to which this article refers are to be found in Articles 1 and 2 of the
Charter, and include the right of states to self-determination, respect
for human rights, the principle of sovereign equality, an obligation to
act in good faith, and an obligation not to intervene in matters
"essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of member states.42 As the
International Court of Justice stated in the Certain Expenses advisory
opinion in 1962:
When the organization takes action which warrants the asser-
tion that it was appropriate for the fulfillment of one of the
stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that
such action is not ultra vires the organization.
Another limiting provision is Article 25. As previously stated, perhaps
the greatest import of the text of this article is the establishment of the
universally binding character of Security Council decisions. 44 However,
the fact that, under this provision, members agree to accept and carry
40. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal onJurisdiction, 28 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
41. See DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII OF
THE U.N. CHARTER 29-33 (2001).
42. U.N. Charter arts. 1-2.
43. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (July 20).
44. See Rosalyn Higgins, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions are Binding
Under Article 25 of the Charter?, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 270, 275 (1972).
2012]
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out the decisions of the Security Council "in accordance with the
present charter"45 suggests that the measure of this obedience should
be contingent upon the validity of the Council's decisions and actions
as held up to the standard of the provisions of the Charter, and further
that it is conceivable that other provisions of the Charter might in some
cases take precedence over conflicting Security Council decisions.46 To
paraphrase the article's meaning in this regard, UN members are not
obligated to comply with the decisions of the Council one whit further
than those decisions themselves comply with the provisions of the
Charter.47
Although the general purposes and principles of the United Nations
are difficult to apply in a meaningful way so as to provide justiciable
limitations on the powers of the Security Council under Article 24(2),
in the nonproliferation issue area the process for creation of new
nonproliferation law contained in Articles 11(1) and 26 described
above does provide a clear, authoritative lawmaking procedure which
can properly be called the UN Charter system for creation of nonprolif-
eration law. As this explicitly-provided system involves a clearly delin-
eated division of roles and authorities between the organs of the UN, it
thus comprises a limitation upon the authority of the Security Council
deriving from "the internal division of power within the organiza-
tion."48 This limitation is therefore a part of the substantive law of the
Charter in accordance with which, under Article 25, the Security
Council is bound to act.
49
Thus, while the provisions of the Charter in many instances provide
limitations upon the powers of the Council which, though valid, are
difficult to apply unambiguously, due to the presence of the lawmaking
system contained in Articles 11(1) and 26, the nonproliferation law
creation issue area fortunately does not labor under the same difficulty.
I argue that the Article 25 limitations on the Council's powers can be
applied in the nonproliferation law issue area because of the presence
of the criteria for legitimate lawmaking by UN bodies contained in
45. U.N. Charter art. 25.
46. SeeJ. Delbruck, Article 25, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 407-418
(Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1st ed. 1994); EIKA DE WET, THE CHAPrER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS SECURrIY COUNCIL 375-78 (2004); PETER ROSGEN, RECHTSETZUNGSAKTE DER VEREINTEN
NATIONEN UND IHRER SONDERORGANISATIONEN: BESTANDSAUFNAHME UND VOLLZUG IN DER BuNDESRE-
PUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 157 (1985).
47. See DE WET, supra note 46, at 377.
48. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal onJurisdiction, 1 28 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
49. See id.
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Articles 11 (1) and 26 of the UN Charter. Accordingly, any act by the
Security Council which attempts to create "a system for the regulation
of armaments" outside of the Article 11 (1) and Article 26 institutional
process is in breach of Article 25, and is thus an act ultra vires the
Council's authority.
50
I argue that Security Council Resolution 1540 meets this test pre-
cisely. This resolution clearly attempts to establish a system for the
regulation of WMD, which includes a universalized export control law
requirement and a universalized requirement to enact laws on the
subject of non-state actors. Therefore, to be valid as a source of binding
obligation upon UN member states, I argue that this system of obliga-
tions cannot be established through the Council's use of its Chapter VII
powers, but must rather be constructed through the procedures pro-
vided for in Articles 11 (1) and 26.
My essential argument regarding Resolution 1540 is that in passing
what can only be viewed as an ostensible piece of international legisla-
tion in this resolution, the Security Council has confused the proper
scope of its enforcement powers under Chapter VII with the proper
scope of its long unused, limited lawmaking powers under Article 26,
and has taken to itself by unilateral exercise of its Chapter VII powers a
role which, under the Charter system, it is to share both with the
General Assembly in the exercise of its Article 11 (1) powers, as well as
with the general membership of the United Nations, to whom it is
directed under Article 26 to submit proposals for the creation of new
international laws in the area of weapons proliferation.
The added political, legal, and chronological efficiency of the path
chosen by the Security Council is not denied. For the members of the
Security Council, and particularly for the permanent members who
enjoy the most power from their positions on the Council, when consider-
ing the establishment of the obligations contained in Resolution 1540, the
long-unused Charter system for creation of nonproliferation law would
certainly have looked less attractive, particularly as the amount of control
they would have been able to exercise over the outcome of the approval
process under the Charter system would have been severely diluted from
that they would wield through the Chapter VII process.
However, none of these reasons of expedition and control give
sufficient justification for going around the Charter system and assum-
ing a lawmaking authority which was never intended to be exercised by
the Council under the Charter. The Charter system in Articles 11(1)
50. See Happold, supra note 7, at 604-05.
2012]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
and 26 is the authoritative system for the creation of new nonprolifera-
tion law for good reasons. The system in Articles 11 (1) and 26 divides
roles among the political organs of the UN, leaving the final and most
important role of actual establishment as law of the principles gener-
ated through this institutional process, to the member states of the UN
themselves. This system was created by the Charter framers in mainte-
nance of the classical principles of state sovereignty and sovereign
equality in international lawmaking, and was consistent with the result-
ing idea that the consent of states to be bound underlies the validity of
all of the sources of international law, in the positivist tradition. 5' This
system was informed by the understanding that the consent given to
Council authority in the first instance by states in Article 25 of the
Charter does not equate to direct consent of states at the second
instance to every substantive decision of the Council. And while this
distinction is less troublesome in the domestic context under most
theories of the positivist social compact, it is troubling to states in the
international legal system which more jealously guard their sovereign
autonomy under the sometimes maligned, but still quite virile West-
phalian sovereignty paradigm.52
In adopting Resolution 1540, the Security Council, whose role in the
Charter system for nonproliferation law creation is really a facilitative
and definitional one, effectively bypassed the steps assigned to the
General Assembly and to the member states by taking the issue to itself
and acting both in the deliberative role assigned to the General
Assembly, as well as the law creation role assigned to the members
collectively. In doing so, the Council acted in disharmony with the
fundamental international legal principle of state sovereignty, and the
derivative principle of the consensual foundation of the sources of
international law. In short, it acted as a legal hegemon, unbound by the
fundamental rules and principles of international law, and the limited
nature of its own authority under the Charter.
II. IRAN
A. Resolution 1737
The Second case study to be considered is that of Iran's nuclear
program. In late 2002, the world learned from Iranian opposition
51. See S. Hall, The Persistent Spectre: Natural Law, International Order and the Limits of Legal
Positivism, 12 EuR.J. INT'L L. 269 (2001).
52. See generally STEPHEN KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HypocIusy? (1999) (discussing
Westphalian system).
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groups in exile that Iran had concealed from the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) for eighteen years the existence of facilities at
Natanz and Arak engaged in experiments involving uranium enrich-
ment and plutonium separation. Upon a report by IAEA inspectors
detailing their findings of the undeclared activities, the IAEA Board of
Governors reached the conclusion in a resolution passed November 26,
2003 that, due to this concealment and to other reporting omissions,
Iran had "in a number of instances" failed to meet its obligations under
its safeguards agreement with the agency. 54 In its resolution the Board
further recognized that Iran had a particular onus of cooperation and
transparency in order to "provide and maintain the assurances re-
quired by Member States" and "restore confidence."55 Iran subse-
quently agreed upon a temporary suspension of its uranium enrich-
ment activities and in December 2003 signed the IAEA Additional
Protocol. 6
Despite these concessions, Iran has continuously maintained that all
of its work with fissile materials and related technologies, including
work at these undeclared sites, has been aimed at furthering its capacity
to produce civilian nuclear energy.57 They have thus argued, notwith-
standing their failure to comply with reporting requirements under
their safeguards agreement, that they have always been in compliance
with their substantive obligations under the NPT. In this argument,
they have relied specifically upon the "inalienable right" of all states to
engage in peaceful uses of nuclear technologies recognized in Article
IV, paragraph 1, of the NPT.58
However, suspicions have become widespread particularly among
Western states and Israel, that Iran does indeed have nuclear weapons
ambitions, and that particularly the uranium enrichment work which
Iran has carried out is intended not solely for use in peaceful energy
production, but for the creation of nuclear weapons. 59 Notwithstand-
ing these suspicions, IAEA inspectors have to date found no conclusive
53. See Greg Bruno, Iran's Nuclear Program, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 10, 2010),
http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-nuclear-program/p1681 1.
54. Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the
Islamic Republic oflran, at 2, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/81 (Nov. 26, 2003).
55. See id. at 2.
56. SeeBruno, supra note 53.
57. See id.
58. Joyner, supra note 1, at 51. For an analysis of the legal arguments surrounding Iran's
nuclear program, see id. at 50-55.
59. See Bruno, supra note 53.
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evidence to support allegations of a clandestine nuclear weapons
program in Iran.6°
Despite this lack of evidence of a weapons program, the IAEA Board
of Governors took the decision on February 4, 2006 to refer Iran's case
to the UN Security Council.61 This referral, without a supporting report
by IAEA inspectors providing evidence that Iran was in breach of its
substantive NPT obligations, or that it was in continuing breach of its
safeguards agreement, has led some to criticize the Board's decision as
premature.62 However, notwithstanding these concerns, on July 31,
2006 the Security Council passed Resolution 1696 in which, acting
under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it demanded that
Iran suspend all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activi-
ties, and requested a report from the LAEA Director-General by August
31 to confirm this suspension.63 The Council followed up Resolution
1696 on December 23, 2006 with Resolution 1737, in which it acted
under Article 41 of the Charter and made binding the demands of
Resolution 1696.64
Iran's failure to abide by the terms of these resolutions, insisting that
its activities are firmly within its rights under NPT Article IV, has led to
the issuance of further Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII,
including a number of resolutions imposing trade restrictions and
other economic sanctions upon Iran and upon specified Iranian indi-
viduals and business entities.65
60. See IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security
Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1 35, IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/29 (June 9, 2011)
(listing suspicious but indefinitive Iranian nuclear activities); see also NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL,
IRAN: NUCLEAR INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES 5 (2007), available at http://www.dni.gov/press.
releases/20071203_release.pdf. For a fuller discussion of the question of evidence of an Iranian
nuclear weapons program, see Daniel H. Joyner, Why Less is More: Law and Policy Considerations on
the Iranian Nuclear Issue, HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. (Mar. 23, 2010, 9:29 PM), http://hlpronline.com/
2010/03/joyner-iran/.
61. LAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA
Doc. GOV/2006/14 (Feb. 4, 2006).
62. See Gareth Smyth & Daniel Dombey, Iran Offers Cautious Response to Nuclear Call FIN.
TIMES, January 14, 2006 ("Jean-Baptiste Mattei, French foreign ministry spokesman, said any
demand for sanctions against Iran was "premature for the moment.").
63. S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006).
64. S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23,2006).
65. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. 5/RES/1747 (Mar. 24,2007); S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008); S.C. Res. 1835, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1835 (Sept. 27, 2008); S.C. Res.
1887, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1887 (Sep. 24, 2009); S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 5.
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B. Resolution 1929
Tensions between Iran and Western powers were aggravated by
Iran's disclosure in September 2009 that it had for some years been
constructing a facility near Qom intended as an additional uranium
enrichment facility to supplement its primary enrichment facility at
Natanz.66 Since this disclosure by Iran, one of the points of debate
among international observers has been whether in the timing of this
disclosure, Iran violated its obligations under its legal agreements with
the IAEA.
67
Iran has argued that its disclosure was perfectly consistent with its
legal obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA (INF-
CIRC/214), as implemented through a Subsidiary Arrangements agree-
ment which Iran entered into with the IAEA in 1976.68 Under the
provisions of this Subsidiary Arrangements agreement known as "Code
3.1," Iran has argued that it is only obligated to disclose the existence of
new enrichment facilities "normally not later than 180 days before the
facility is scheduled to receive nuclear material for the first time."69
Some observers, however, argue that Iran did in fact violate its
international obligations by not disclosing the existence of the Qom
facility earlier.70 They argue that Iran agreed by exchange of letters
with the IAEA in 2003 to a new and revised set of Subsidiary Arrange-
ments, known as "modified Code 3.1," which provide that preliminary
design information on new enrichment facilities is to be provided "as
soon as the decision to construct or to authorize construction has been
taken, whichever is earlier.,
7 1
The crux of the dispute regarding which of the versions of Code 3.1
is applicable to Iran's actions in and around September 2009 centers
on Iran's March 29, 2007 letter to the LAEA in which Iran declared its
66. See Bruno, supra note 53.
67. SeeJames Acton, Iran Violated International Obligations on Qom Facility, CARNEGIE ENDOW-
MENT (Sep. 25, 2009), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=
view&id=23884.
68. See IAEA: Iran Broke Law by Not Revealing Nuclear Facility, CNN (Sep. 30, 2009), http://
articles.cnn.com/2009-09-30/world/iran.iaea.nuclear_-iranian-atomic-energy-agency-ali-
akbar-salehi-united-nation-s-nuclear-watchdog?_s= PM:WORLD.
69. See IAEA, Communication Dated 29 March 2007from the Resident Representative of the Islamic
Republic ofIran and the Secretariat's Response, at 3, IAEA Doc. GOV/INF/2007/8 (Mar. 30, 2007).
70. Acton, supra note 67.
71. IAEA Complains of Iran's "Inconsistent"Adherence to Nuclear Reporting Requirements, "GLOBAL
SECURITY NEWSWIRE, (Mar. 6, 2009), http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/iaea-complains-of-irans-
inconsistent-adherence-to-nuclear-reporting-requirements/.
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intention to "revert" to the original 1976 Code 3.1 formulation.72 The
IAEA Legal Advisor's office issued an opinion in March 2009 in which it
rejected Iran's unilateral declaration of reversion, and maintained that
the agreed modified Code 3.1 provisions remained in force between
Iran and the IAEA.7 As the Legal Advisor's office concluded:
The implementation of the provisions of Subsidiary Arrange-
ments can only be amended or suspended with the agreement
of both parties to them... The provisions cannot be amended
or suspended unilaterally by the state. Thus Iran's failure to
provide design information in accordance with the modified
Code 3.1 as agreed to by Iran in 2003 is inconsistent with Iran's
obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safe-
guards Agreement.
74
The UN Security Council entered the fray of this essentially legal
debate onJune 9, 2010 with the passage of Resolution 1929, in which it
acted under Article 41 of the Charter and decided that Iran:
shall without delay comply fully and without qualification with
its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including through the applica-




In consideration of the legal merits of Iran's claim ofjustification of
its nuclear activities by reference to Article IV of the NPT, it is
important first to note that uranium enrichment, when declared, is not
an NPT violation per se. Certainly when uranium is enriched to a U-235
presence of less than 20%, and can thus still be classified as Low-
Enriched Uranium (LEU), that enrichment activity is one that is fully
includable within the Article V inalienable right to engage in peaceful
72. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security
Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, at 3, IAEA Doc. GOV/2007/22 (May 23, 2007).
73. IAEA, Statement of the Legal Adviser, IAEA Mtg. of the Board of Governors (Mar. 2009), available
at http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/file_download/162/LegalAdviserIran.pdf.
74. Id.
75. S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 5, 5.
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uses of nuclear technologies.76 This understanding was clear at the
time of the drafting of the NPT. As the Director of the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency told the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in 1968:
It may be useful to point out, for illustrative purposes, several
activities which the United States would not consider per se to
be violations of the prohibitions in Article II. Neither uranium
enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable material in con-
nection with a peaceful program would violate Article II so long
as these activities were safeguarded under Article III. Also
clearly permitted would be the development, under safeguards,
of plutonium fueled power reactors, including research on the
properties of metallic plutonium, nor would Article II interfere
with the development or use of fast breeder reactors under
safeguards.77
Japan and a number of other Non-nuclear Weapon State (NNWS)
parties to the NPT have carried out enrichment of uranium for the
purpose of nuclear power generation for many years without complaint
from the IAEA Board of Governors. Japan has in fact separated and
stockpiled at least 43.1 tons of plutonium, as well as having a robust and
productive gas centrifuge program for uranium enrichment at its
facility in Rokkasho, Aomori prefecture, thus illustrating that even the
overproduction and stockpiling of fissile materials is deemed permis-
sible by the IAEA.78 It is only when this enrichment activity by an NNWS
is undeclared to the LAEA that a violation of an IAEA safeguards
agreement results. Even this, however, is not a violation of the NPT per
se. Only if enrichment proceeds to the production of Highly-Enriched
Uranium (HEU), at approximately 20% presence of U-235, does it
produce a weapons-usable material. 79 Undeclared enrichment of weap-
ons-usable HEU would create a prima facie case of breach of Article II
76. See RAYMOND MuRRAY, NUCLEAR ENERGY: AN INTRODUCrION TO THE CONCEPTS, SYSTEMS AND
APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR PROCESSES 453 (6th ed. 2009).
77. Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 90th Cong. 39 (July 10-12, 17, 1968) (extension of remarks by Mr. Foster in response to
question regarding nuclear explosive devices).
78. Japan's "Separated" Plutonium Stockpile Increases to 43 Tons, KYOTO NEWS AGENCY (Sep. 6,
2005), http://www.redorbit.com/news/science/231519/japans-separated-plutonium-stockpile-
increases to_43_tons/index.html.
79. See MuRRAy, supra note 76, at 456.
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of the NPT, and such activity would not be justifiable by reference to
Article IV.
In my view, as a matter of law Iran was therefore quite correct in its
interpretation of the coverage of its uranium enrichment activities by
Article IV of the NPT at least until December 23, 2006.80 The basis of its
case was not altered by previous IAEA urgings that Iran cease uranium
enrichment, as the IAEA's only legal competence is in the administra-
tion of safeguards agreements, and the continuation of uranium
enrichment in declared sites, under IAEA safeguards, poses no chal-
lenge to the provisions of Iran's safeguards agreement. The legal
landscape did change, however, on December 23, 2006 with the
passage of Security Council Resolution 1737, under which the Council
exercised its authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to order
Iran to cease uranium enrichment.
Regardless of the prudence or other merit of this demand by the
Council, in passing this resolution the Council likely did change the
legal underpinnings of Iran's case forjustifying its enrichment activities
by reference to NPT Article IV. This issue can be approached legally
under a number of different theories. The most often cited theory
focuses on the provisions of the UN Charter, of which Iran is a
member, which in Article 103 specifies that "[i] n the event of a conflict
between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under
the present Charter and their obligations under any other interna-
tional agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall
prevail." 81 The obligations of the Charter are thus declared superior to
all other treaty rights and obligations by its own terms. One of the
substantive obligations United Nations members undertake in the
Charter is spelled out in Article 25, which states that "[t] he Members of
the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."
Thus, under this analysis, with the passage of Resolution 1737, the
Council invoked Iran's obligation as a UN member to abide by the
Council's decisions under Article 25, which is an obligation superior to
all other treaty obligations pursuant to Article 103, inclusive of the
rights and duties contained in the NPT. Iran thus became legally
obligated to comply with Resolution 1737, as well as with all other
resolutions passed by the Security Council under its Chapter VII
80. For a fuller consideration of the scope and meaning of NPT Article IV, see DANIEL H.
JOYNER, INTERPRETING THE NucLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY 40, 47-50, 64-68 (2011).
81. U.N. Charter art. 103.
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authority, and unable to rely upon its right to peaceful use of nuclear
technologies in NPT Article IV to justify actions in disharmony with
such Council decisions.
The problem with this analysis, however, is that it would empower
the UN Security Council to trump any of the rights held by states by
virtue of their statehood. The implications of this theory are far
reaching and unsettling. Article IV of the NPT, to which 187 states are
currently parties, recognizes the residual entitlement of NNWS treaty
parties to possess and use nuclear technologies and materials for
peaceful purposes, notwithstanding the obligations not to pursue
nuclear weapons which they were to undertake in Article 11.82 This
residual entitlement is termed by the treaty to be an "inalienable right."
This is strong language intended to convey deep legal meaning,
analogous to the recognition in Article 51 of the UN Charter of an
"inherent right" of self-defense.83 This phrasing is intent upon charac-
terizing the right guaranteed by this provision not simply as a right
created by the present positive conventional instrument, but rather as a
pre-existing right independent of the treaty, and only recognized by its
terms.84 Like the inherent right to self-defense recognized by the UN
Charter, this inalienable right to possess and use nuclear technologies
and materials for peaceful purposes would appear to be recognized by
the 187 states party to the NPT as comprising one of the bundle of
rights inuring to a state by virtue of its statehood, and recognized in
both customary and conventional international law.
It can be argued (as I have done elsewhere) that one theory for the
superiority of Chapter VII resolutions over the rights of NPT Article IV
is simply to be found in the reasoning that, as noted above, the rights
defined in Article IV are not creations alone of the treaty terms of the
NPT, but are rather rights recognized by the terms of the treaty yet
existing independently within the bundle of rights inherent in the
attributes of a state.85 Under this reasoning, while the Article IV rights
82. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. 4, opened for signature July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970).
83. On the recognition of the customary right of self-defense in UN Charter Article 51, see
DEREK BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 185 (1958) ("It is .. fallacious to assume that
members have only those rights which the Charter accords to them; on the contrary they have
those rights which general international law accords to them except in so far as they have
surrendered them under the Charter .... [T] he view of Committee I at San Francisco was that this
prohibition [Article 2(4)] left the right of self-defense unimpaired.").
84. See Hall, supra note 51, at 284-89. On the question of the relationship between this right
and Articles I & II of the NPT, seeJOYNER, supra note 1, at 45-50.
85. JOYNER, supra note 1, at 54.
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are important features of the sovereign character of all NPT parties,
they are nonetheless categorizeable along with all other general state
rights which are, by a state's consent to the terms of Article 25 of the
Charter, made surmountable by and subject to the authority of the
Security Council acting under Chapter VII. Thus far this theory may be
correct, but it does not fully deal with the central question of the scope
of the Charter's Article 39 grant of authority to the Security Council,
and its limits. Over which of their rights did states contract discretion to
the Security Council in exercise of its Article 39 authority, and over
which did they not? This is a question about which books have been
written (notably by David Schweigman and Erika de Wet) and I cannot
do it justice here. 6 However, I will argue that there must be limits to
the Council's Article 39 "powers of appreciation" and resulting authori-
tative discretion, lest the Council become a legal hegemon, unbound
by law in the exercise of its Chapter VII powers.8 7 The idea of the
Security Council, with its unrepresentative makeup and proprietary
rights system comprising such a legal hegemon is unlikely to be
acceptable to most of the nations of the world.
In summary, then, by trampling upon a right of states recognized in a
broadly subscribed treaty to be an "inalienable right," the Security
Council in Resolution 1737 and subsequent related resolutions on Iran
overstepped the bounds of its Chapter VII authority. It has at least in
doing so pushed the limits of that authority to a point at which serious
questions must be asked about the limits of its authority, and how
international law should respond to this challenge in order to guaran-
tee that there are legal limits placed upon the power of the Security
86. See generally SCHWEIGMAN, supra note 41; DE WET, supra note 46.
87. The term "powers of appreciation" is taken fromJudge Shahubuddeen's searching query
in his opinion in the Lockerbie case:
The question now raised.., is whether a decision of the Security Council may override
the legal rights of states, and, if so, whether there are any limitations on the power of the
Council to characterize a situation as one justifying the making of a decision entailing
such consequences. Are there any limits to the Council's powers of appreciation? In the
equilibrium of forces underpinning the United Nations within the evolving interna-
tional order, is there a conceivable point beyond which a legal issue may properly arise as
to the competence of the Security Council to produce such overriding results? If there
are any limits, what are those limits, and what body, if other than the Security Council, is
competent to say what those limits are?
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. UK), 1992 I.C.J. 3, 142 (Apr. 14) (separate opinion of
Judge Shahabuddeen).
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Council, preventing it from becoming a legal hegemon unbound by
law.
2. Resolution 1929
Returning to the discussion above in the context of Resolution 1540,
of the limits on the Security Council's authority expressed particularly
in Article 25 of the Charter, I argue that Resolution 1929 represents yet
another occasion on which the Council has acted ultra vires its Chapter
VII authority. The analysis here is very similar to that conducted above
in the case of Resolution 1540. In the case of Resolution 1929, the
Security Council considered what is essentially a legal question - i.e. the
obligations of Iran under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and
whether those obligations include either the original or the modified
Code 3.1 formulation with regard to the disclosure of the existence of
new nuclear facilities. The Council made what can only be described as
a judicial decision, accepting one legal argument or interpretation as
more persuasive than another. In unmistakably judicial form, the
Council then ruled on the legal question by issuing an order that the
party in the dock before it must abide by its determination of the law.
Again, under the UN Charter Article 25 analysis adopted above,
notwithstanding the Council's broad mandate in Articles 39, 40, and
41, there are limits to the Council's authority to act under Chapter VII.
Such limitations can be most clearly determined when the Charter
itself provides for an alternative decision-making process or forum.
And the Charter is quite clear on the question of which forum, or organ
within the institutional structure it creates, is to decide legal disputes,
and perform judicial functions.
In Article 92, it provides that the International Court ofJustice "shall
be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations."8 8 And even
more specifically, in Article 36 it provides this explicit directive and
reminder to the Security Council itself:
In making recommendations under this Article the Security
Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes
should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the
International Court ofJustice in accordance with the provisions
of the Statute of the Court.89
88. U.N. Charter art. 92.
89. Id. art. 25.
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As discussed above the Security Council does have broad authority to
act under the Articles of Chapter VII when it determines the existence
of a threat to international peace and security. But this authority is not
without bounds. The Security Council itself is bound by Article 25 to act
in accordance with the Charter.90 The Council is in this way bound to
observe the order and delegations of roles provided for by the instru-
ment from which it draws its own authority. Where, as in Articles 36 and
92, the Charter clearly delegates a role and type of authority to a
separate UN organ, 91 the Security Council cannot legally usurp the
authority so delegated, and arrogate it to its own use.
I argue that in passing Resolution 1929, the Council did just that. It
usurped the role of the International Court ofJustice in settling a legal
dispute among UN member states, and in exercising an essentially
judicial interpretive/determinative function to do so. This is a role
which was never intended by the Charter framers for the Security
Council to fulfill. The Council has neither the mandate nor the
qualifications to act as an international judicial body. In passing
Resolution 1929, therefore, the Council acted in contravention of
Article 25 of the Charter. The operative paragraphs in Resolution 1929
which express the determinations of the Council acting in this judicial
role, notably paragraph 5 quoted above, are therefore ultra vires the
Council's authority and, like Resolution 1540, are as a result void ab
initio. 92
However, the fact that the Security Council, notwithstanding its lack
of authority in the Charter do so, nevertheless is convinced that it can
act as an international judiciary, in addition to its newly assumed
legislative role, gives rise to grave concern that the Council considers
itself above the law-a legal hegemon.
III. NORTH KoREA
The third and final case study to be considered will be the nuclear
program of North Korea. Security Council Resolution 1874 was ad-
opted on June 12, 2009 in response to the nuclear weapon test which
had been conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of North
Korea (DPRK) on May 25, 2009. This was the second nuclear weapon
test conducted by the DPRK, its first having been held on October 9,
90. Id. arts. 36, 92.
91. Id.
92. JOYNER, supra note 1, at 195.
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2006. 9  The Security Council had responded to the first nuclear test by
the adoption of Resolution 1718 on October 14, 2006. 94 Resolution
1874 essentially reiterates the Security Council's condemnatory posi-
tion on the DPRK's nuclear tests, and it further builds upon and supple-
ments the sanctions imposed upon the DPRK in Resolution 1718.95
Resolution 1874 represented the latest in a long line of Security
Council resolutions focused on the problem of the DPRK's nuclear
weapons program. 96 Longstanding international concern about the
DPRK's nuclear weapons program had been aggravated by three
principal events: the first was the DPRK's announcement on January
10, 2003 that it would withdraw from the NPT, and the second and
third were the 2006 and 2009 nuclear weapon tests.
9 7
The DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT was significant on a number of
levels. It represented the first and only time that a state had withdrawn
its membership from the treaty, which is the cornerstone legal instru-
ment in the nuclear non-proliferation normative regime. It also effec-
tively removed from the DPRK any obligation of either conventional or
customary international law prohibiting it from developing or possess-
ing, or even proliferating, nuclear weapons.98 It is within this context of
the DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT, and its evidencing to the world
its possession of nuclear weapons through its tests, that Resolution 1874
must be understood.
In Resolution 1874, acting under Article 41 of its Chapter VII
authority, the Council first condemns "in the strongest terms" the May
25, 2009 nuclear test.99 It then demands that the DPRK not conduct
any further nuclear weapon tests, or launch of any ballistic missile
technology. 100 These injunctions are clearly aimed at reiterating the
prohibitions placed upon the DPRKby Resolution 1718, and at address-
ing the immediate symptoms of the problem of its nuclear weapons
program. The Council then, however, goes on to address the more
93. See Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy, ARMS CONTROL ASS'N,
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron (last visited Nov. 4, 2011).
94. S.C. Res. 1718, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006).
95. See S.C. Res. 1874, supra note 4.
96. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 825, U.N. Doc. S/RES/825 (May 11, 1993); S.C. Res. 1695, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1695 (July 15, 2006); S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 94.
97. See ARMs CONTROL ASS'N, supra note 93.
98. Masahiko Asada, Arms Control Law in Crisis? A Study of the North Korean Nuclear Issue, 9 J.
CoNFLicr & SECURITyL. 331, 341-55 (2004).
99. S.C. Res. 1874, supra note 4.
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fundamental legal problem relating to the DPRK's nuclear weapons
program-the current absence of international law prohibiting the
DPRK from development, possession, and proliferation of nuclear
weapons. In operative paragraphs 5 and 6, the Council demands that
North Korea retract its statement of withdrawal from the NPT, and
return "at an early date" to membership in the NPT and to a safeguards
agreement with the IAEA.Y'O
Following its demand that the DPRK rejoin the NPT, the Council
proceeds in operative paragraph 8 to 'decide'-thus using its most
binding and determinative language-that the DPRK shall abandon its
nuclear weapons and related development program, and shall submit
itself to the terms of a safeguards agreement administered by the
IAEA. 10 2 The DPRK concluded a safeguards agreement with the JAEA
on January 30, 1992 (INFCIRC/403). However, pursuant to Article 26
of the safeguards agreement, its continuance in force was limited to the
term of the DPRK's membership in the NPT. 10 3 Thus, the DPRK's
withdrawal from the NPT simultaneously worked a withdrawal from its
safeguards agreement with the IAEA.10 4 Operative paragraph 8 of
Resolution 1874 thus purports to reverse both the DPRK's withdrawal
from the NPT and its withdrawal from its IAEA safeguards agreement,
by commanding the state to abide by one of the central obligations of
the NPT-i.e. the obligation of Non-nuclear Weapon States not to
develop or possess nuclear weapons-and to abide by the terms of its
IAEA safeguards agreement.
This demand and these decisions by the Security Council are singu-
lar. First made in Resolution 1718 and then reiterated in Resolution
1874, the Council's demand that the DPRK rejoin the NPT is the only
example, to my knowledge, of the Security Council demanding that a
state re-accede to a treaty from which that state had duly withdrawn
according to the treaty's terms. And as if that were not enough, the
Council in operative paragraph 8 goes one step further and essentially
101. Id. 5-6.
102. Id. 8.
103. Article 26 of the DPRK's safeguards agreement provides: "This Agreement shall remain
in force as long as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is party to the [NPT]." IAEA,
Agreement of3OJanuayy 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at 8, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/403 (May 1992).
104. See Frederic Kirgis, North Korea's Withdrawalfrom the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, ASIL
INSIGHT (Jan. 2003), http://www.asil.org/insigh96.cfm.
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decides that, regardless of what the DPRK thinks or does, it is bound by
the central obligation of the NPT and by the terms of its former IAEA
safeguards agreement. Furthermore, it cannot be forgotten that, in
unapologetically hypocritical fashion, the Council is deciding in opera-
tive paragraph 8 that a particular state is not allowed, apparently in
perpetuam, to develop and possess the same weapons technologies
which at least eight other states-five of whom have permanent seats on
the Council itself-are known to possess.
In its NPT-related decisions concerning North Korea, therefore, the
Security Council has determined that it has the authority to contravene
a state's decision to withdraw from the obligations of treaties, accord-
ing to those treaties' explicitly stated rights of withdrawal. It has further
determined that, regardless of the will or contrary actions of a state, it
has the authority to impose permanent, substantive obligations on a
state with regard to its military capabilities.
These actions of the Security Council would seem to carry serious
implications with regard to the consensual nature of all of the sources
of international law, which is in turn intimately linked to the sovereign
character of states in the international legal system. If the Security
Council can order a state to enter into, or at least maintain jus
dispositivum obligations against the will of the state concerned, what
indeed can the Security Council not do? From ajurisprudential perspec-
tive, by asserting its power over the consent of states to be bound by
international law, the Council's actions regarding North Korea repre-
sent an even more fundamental "authority grab" by the Council than
do its actions regarding Iran. In its Resolutions 1718 and 1874, the
Council appears to consider itself unbound by the fundamental rules
and principles of international law and the sovereign character of the
member states of the United Nations, and empowered to do anything it
deems expedient to bring about international peace and security. In
short, it appears to consider itself a legal hegemon.
IV. How CAN INTERNATIONAL LAw PROTECT STATES FROM THE SECURITY
COUNCIL?
In the case studies above, taken from the nuclear nonproliferation
issue area, I have shown what I argue to be several examples of the
Security Council demonstrating its relatively recent determination that
it is essentially unbound by law, whether UN Charter law or otherwise,
in its fulfillment of its broad and vague mandate to maintain and
restore international peace and security. I would further argue that it is
also clear from the context of these case studies that in each case it was
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the permanent five members of the Council, who are also not coinciden-
tally the five Nuclear Weapon State parties to the NPT, who led the
charge in getting the relevant Security Council resolutions adopted.
This fact has led some in the developing world to argue that the
permanent five have essentially highjacked the Security Council in
order to use it as an instrument of unbridled legal authority for
carrying out their own desires for international lawmaking in this
area. 10 5 As the representative from Indonesia stated at the April 2008
NPT Preparatory Committee meeting:
[T]he tendency for the Security Council to judge compliance
and to act as an enforcer of the NPT needs to be urgently
rectified. There is no doubt this inclination has a political motiva-
tion, as the Council will not in anyway act in a similar manner on
non-compliance to Article VI. It has also become a source of
concern that the expansion of the Security Council involvement in
this field risks to undermine the authority of the LAEA.
106
Interestingly, the Indonesian Ambassador here argues specifically
that the permanent five have used the Security Council to accomplish
their own political interests in the name of enforcing NPT law, yet have
hypocritically ignored very significant issues of disarmament law under
NPT Article VI, because this would not serve their political interests.
This realization of the permanent five's adoption of the Security
Council as an instrument for carrying out their own political agendas
through international lawmaking in this area, is likely to be quite
disconcerting to many smaller, developing countries, who might legiti-
mately worry whether they will be the next target of the Council's
omnipotent and politically motivated attentions. It thus becomes neces-
sary to consider what international law, and the international legal
system, can or should do to protect states, particularly smaller and
developing states, from the UN Security Council and its demonstrated
bullish, near hegemonic attitude towards its own legal authority. I
would like to explore one vein of thinking in the remainder of this
105. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 23-24, 30-33, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (Apr.
22, 2004) (statements of India, Cuba and Iran); U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 2-5, 16-17,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (Resumption 1) (Apr. 22, 2004) (statements of Egypt, Mexico and Nambia).
106. Ambassador I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja, Republic of Indon., Statement at the Second
Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the State Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.un.org/
NPT201/SecondSession/delegates%20statements/Indonesia.pdf.
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article.
10 7
In addition to the hierarchically equal jus dispositivum sources of
international law (i.e. treaties, custom, and general principles) it has
come to be generally accepted that there are a few 'higher obligations'
which are universal and non-derogable for states in the international
legal system. These higher-order, peremptory rules are termed jus
cogens.'0 8 As Ian Brownlie has written:
In the recent past both doctrine and judicial opinion have
supported the view that certain overriding principles of interna-
tional law exist, forming a body of jus cogens .... They are rules
of customary law which cannot be set aside by treaty or acquies-
cence but only by the formation of a subsequent customary rule
of contrary effect. The least controversial examples of the class
are the prohibition of the use of force, the law of genocide, the
principle of racial non-discrimination, crimes against human-
ity, and the rules prohibiting trade in slaves and piracy. 10 9
Jus cogens rules are the closest that the current international legal
system comes to constitutional, or higher order system rules. As this
enumerated list demonstrates, however, the most widely accepted rules
of jus cogens are prohibitions of certain conduct by states, and in a very
few cases by individuals, deemed universally unacceptable by the
international community. There have been some indications of prin-
ciples of law constituting state entitlements, or rights, in customary
international law having attainedjus cogens status, but they are consider-
ably more controversial. These include the principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources and the principle of self-determina-
tion.1 10 Indeed, the status and substance of these principles even as
107. In a similar vein and from an institutional perspective, I recently argued for a
renaissance of attention to the International Court ofJustice's role as a judicial check upon the
Security Council. To avoid redundancy, I will not pursue that line of thought here. However, it
does fit nicely under this theme. SeeJOYNER, supra note 1, at 218-25.
108. See, e.g., ALEXANDER ORAKHELASrrvLu, PEREMPTORY NoRMs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8-9
(2006).
109. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 510-11 (7th ed. 2008).
110. On natural resources, see G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3171 (Dec. 17,
1973), and G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974). On self-
determination, see Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belg. v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 3,
304 (Feb. 5) (separate opinion of judge Ammoun). The concept of self-determination is not
strictly speaking a right of states, but more precisely the right of a people in a particular
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rules of customary international law are disputed."11 Thus, to date,
clear jus cogens status has been attained almost exclusively by rules of
international law which prevent states from using their authority and
power to harm individuals.
However, an important new data point was created in this area by the
European Court ofJustice (ECJ) in its 2008 decision in the Kadi case.
112
In this case, the ECJ struck down an E.U. Council regulation which had
frozen the financial assets of Mr. Kadi and Mr. Al Barakaat. This E.U.
regulation was in direct implementation of UN Security Council resolu-
tions requiring enforcement by UN member states of financial sanc-
tions against persons designated by the Council's Sanctions Committee
as being involved in international terrorism. In Kadi, the ECJ struck
down the regulation because it determined that the regulation violated
certain fundamental due process rights guaranteed to E.U. nationals
under E.U. law."
13
The Kadi decision constitutes an important data point for purposes
of my current analysis because, inter alia, this case stands for the
proposition that the UN Security Council cannot override domestic law
when that domestic law contains fundamental legal rights. This case
marks one of the first times that a tribunal, whether international or
domestic, has held a Security Council resolution to be unlawful in its
implementation to a domestic legal system, and thus establishes an
important persuasive precedent of the principle that the power of the
Security Council is not, in fact, unlimited.
This landmark case may mark the beginning of attempts by states to
create and apply principles of international law which limit the Security
geographical place to constitute a state. However, it is sufficiently similar to a state entitlement for
the analytical purposes herein.
111. On natural resources see, for example, SEDCO, Inc. v. Nat ' Iranian Oil Co., 10 Iran-U.S.
CI. Rep. 180 (1986). On self-determination, see, for example, Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998]
2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
112. Cases C-402/05 P, C-415/05 P, Kadi v. Council, 2008 E.C.R. 1-6351, 3 C.M.L.R. 41.
113. See generally Grdinne de Bfirca, The European Court of Justice and the International Legal
Order After Kadi, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2010); Katja S. Ziegler, Strengthening the Rule of Law, but
Fragmenting International Law: The KadiDecision of the ECJfrom the Perspective of Human Rights, 9 HuM.
RTS. L. RaV. 288 (2009); Jean d'Aspremont & Fredhric Dopagne, Kadi: The ECJ's Reminder of the
Elementay Divide between Legal Orders, 5 INT'L ORG. L. REV. 371 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1341982;J. Craig Barker et al., Kadi and AlBarakaat, 58 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 229 (2009);
Giacinto Della Cananea, Global Security and Procedural Due Process of Law Between the United Nations
and the European Union, 15 COLUM.J. EUR. L. 511 (2009); Pasquale De Sena & Maria C. Vitucci, The
European Courts and the Security Council. Between Dddoublement Fonctionnel and Balancing of Values, 20
EUR.J. INT'L L. 193, 221-22 (2009).
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Council's Chapter VII authority, and secure to themselves and their
citizens a measure of legal protection from overly aggressive uses of the
Council's authority. Perhaps this case will be the beginning of a
movement to establish such legal protections for states in a more
systematic and normative fashion. If so, one avenue to pursue may be
the clarification of the basic rights which inure to states by virtue of
their sovereignty, and the establishment of these rights as rules of jus
cogens-supplementing and filling out the existing corpus of jus cogens
rules which, as noted above, currently consist almost exclusively of rules
prohibiting state conduct.
This notion of delineating the basic rights which states possess by
virtue of their statehood is not new. As Sir Arthur Watts has explained:
As international law developed in the second half of the nine-
teenth century and the first half of the twentieth it was thought
useful, and perhaps even necessary, to consider whether there
were some fundamental legal principles which were inherent in
the relations of States as members of the international commu-
nity. The search for some hierarchical structure to the many
particular rules of international law seemed to require no less.
The idea grew that there were certain fundamental rights which
were essential and self-evident attributes of Statehood, together
with certain fundamental duties.
114
In 1949 the newly established International Law Commission ad-
opted a draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States. This draft
Declaration consisted of fourteen draft articles which enunciated, in
broad terms, some of the basic rights and duties of states. The 1949
draft Declaration was never adopted by the General Assembly, and
largely fell by the wayside as geopolitical shifts over the subsequent
decades-notably including the process of decolonization and the
communist/capitalist rivalry between East and West-made agreement
on a statement of states' 'fundamental' rights diminishingly likely.
In 1970, however, a successor statement to the 1949 draft articles was
adopted by the General Assembly, entitled the Declaration on Prin-
ciples of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Coopera-
tion among States.115 This 1970 Declaration predominantly discussed
principles of states' obligations, such as the obligation not to use or
2012]
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threaten force against other states or otherwise to intervene in the
affairs of other states. However, in its discussion of the principle of the
sovereign equality of states, it does delineate some of the most basic
rights of states, including the right "freely to choose and develop its
political, social, economic and cultural systems."
116
Both the 1949 draft Declaration and the 1970 Declaration could be
described as something of a jumble of proclamations of rights and
duties of states, with no clear systematic approach to either subject and
certainly no claim to an exhaustive listing of either rights or duties. The
lack of progress since 1970 on a clear and definitive statement of the
rights of states inuring to them by virtue of their statehood is likely
explained by a number of factors. The first is simply the enormity of the
task of getting agreement by states as to which rights are 'fundamental'
and among the bundle of rights which states inherently possess.1 1 7 The
very notion of fundamental rights of states is a jurisprudential theory
question likely to be seen quite differently by developing and devel-
oped states, and by states with elementally different approaches to
economics and government.
The second factor is the concern, often present in delineation of
entitlements, that the listing of some rights will appear to prejudice
others not listed, and have a limiting effect upon the subject. This
dynamic was analogously present in the deliberations surrounding the
drafting of the United States Constitution, and resulted in a compro-
mise, approach whereunder nine amendments were added to the
original document listing the rights of the constituent states of the
United States, or in some cases the people of those states. Yet a tenth
amendment was further added to make clear that the enumerated
rights were not an exhaustive rendering, and that "[t] he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."' 18
However, the Security Council's newfound excess in its determina-
tion of its own authority, and the arguable use of the Council by the
permanent five as an institutional instrument for hypocritically forward-
ing their own political interests, may make a return to this normative
116. Id.
117. In the nuclear area see, for example, 1 NPT BRIEFING BooK: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME (John Simpson & Tanya Ogilvie-White eds., 2003); Tanya
Ogilvie-White, International Responses to Iranian Nuclear Defiance: The Non-Aligned Movement and the
Issue of Non-Compliance, 18 EUR.J. INT'L L. 453 (2007).
118. See Gary Lawson, A Truism with Attitude: The Tenth Amendment in Constitutional Context, 83
NOTRE DAME L. RE V. 469 (2008).
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effort advisable. The International Law Commission (ILC) spent the
better part of fifty years developing its Draft Articles on State Responsi-
bility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, which it finally adopted in
2001. The development of a similar set of Draft Articles on the
Fundamental Rights of States would seem to be a naturally complemen-
tary project for the ILC to now pursue. Such a normative delineation
and clarification of the rights of states inherently inuring to them by
virtue of their statehood, and recognized in customary international
law, would be the first evolutionary step toward those rights eventually
achieving jus cogens status and thereby constituting a set of needed
limitations on the currently seemingly unlimited authority of the
United Nations Security Council.
Thus, to return to the case study of Iran, if the inalienable right to
peaceful nuclear energy technologies recognized in Article IV of the
NPT were to be additionally recognized as among the fundamental
rights of states, and thereby achieve the status of a rule ofjus cogens, this
would form an effective legal curtailment of the authority of the
Security Council to restrict this fundamental right and would serve to
protect developing countries in their exercise of this right. Other
fundamental rights relative to the case studies reviewed herein might
include the right not to be bound by international legal obligations to
which a state has not expressly or impliedly consented. Such a delinea-
tion of the fundamental rights of states and their establishment as rules
of jus cogens would constitute something of an international "bill of
rights" for states, which could be structured, as the bill of rights in the
U.S. Constitution, to expressly provide for the non-exhaustive nature of
the delineated rights.
This notion of an international bill of rights for states is of course
only one avenue whereby states can begin to draw lines in the sand
setting limits upon the authority of the Security Council. Others
include the more ad hoc approach adopted by the ECJ in the Kadi case,
as well as the strengthening of the authorities of the International
Court ofJustice to more effectively act as a co-equal judicial check upon
the Council. 1 9
However it is pursued, it appears that the international legal system
must develop effective limits upon the authority of the Security Council,
lest the Council become an effective legal hegemon, unbound by law.
119. SeeJose Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 23 (1996). See generally
ANTONIOS TZANKOPOULOS, DISOBEYING THE SECURITY COUNCIL (2011); DE WET, supra note 46;
SCHWEIGMAN, supra note 41; Martenczuk, supra note 19, at 527;JYNER, supra note 1, 218-25.
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